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Abstract. Divided Government is nowadays a common feature of the US political 
system. The voters can cast partisan ballots for two political powers the executive     
(Presidential elections) and the legislative (the Congress election). Some recent stud-
ies have shown that many voters tend to shape their preferences for the political par-
ties by choosing different parties in these two election contests.  This type of behavior 
referred to by Smith et al. (1999) as “ticket splitting” shows irrationality of behavior 
(such as preference reversal) from the perspective of traditional decision making theo-
ries (Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), Savage, (1954)). It has been shown by 
i.e. Zorn and Smith (2011) and also Khrennikova et al. (2014) that these types of 
‘non-separable’ preferences are context dependent and can be well accommodated in 
a quantum like framework. 
In this paper we use data from Smith et al. (1999) to show first of all probabilistic 
violation of classical (Kolmogorovian) framework. We proceed with the depiction of 
our observables (the Congress and the Presidential contexts) with the aid of the quan-
tum probability formula that incorporates the ‘contextuality’ of the decision making 
process through the interference term. Statistical data induces the interference term of 
large magnitude exceeding one (hyperbolic interference). We perform with help of 
our transition probabilities a state reconstruction of the voters state vectors to test for 
the applicability of the generalized Born rule.  This state can be mathematically repre-
sented in the generalized Hilbert space based on hyper-complex numbers.  
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1 Introduction 
The application of the quantum models to phenomena outside the remit of quantum 
physics is not longer perceived as something exotic despite the novelty of this inter-
disciplinary field. The quantum like models that actively pursue the mathematical 
framework and concepts of quantum physics to other social phenomena serve as an 
effective explanatory and descriptive instrument. The philosophy of the application at 
this stage bears an phenomenological character, without the claim that the social and 
cognitive systems are exhibiting quantum features ( i.e. that that human brain is a 
huge quantum system where neurons act like quantum particles).  
The domain of applications includes primarily decision making problems in econom-
ics and cognitive science 1 (Bruza et al., (2009), Busemeyer et al., (2006a, 2006b, 
2007), Franco et al. (2009), Haven and Khrennikov (2009), Photos and Busemeyer 
(2009), Lambert-Mogilansky and Busemeyer (2012), Asano et al., (2012)). Other 
applications to decision theory and expected utility violations are by La Mura (2006), 
Danilov and Lambert Mogiliansky (2006) and Shubik (1999). Many contributions 
were also achieved in the domain of financial instrument modelling and game theory 
by Haven (2005, 2006), Segal and Segal (1998), and Eisert et al., (1999)) see also 
Aerts and Durt (1994) and Aerts and Sozzo (2011) for contributions in logic and cate-
gorization. These and many other findings are successfully reviewed in the books of 
Busemeyer and Bruza (2012) and Haven and Khrennikov (2013).  
  A new domain of application is the political science field with first discussions of 
possibility to model voters’ preferences in a quantum framework by Zorn and Smith 
(2011) and a dynamical representation of the evolution of voters’ preferences, includ-
ing the impact of the so called election campaign “bath”, by Khrennikova et al.,           
(2014). Zorn and Smith (2011) fostered for the motivation of the interdisciplinary 
application of quantum framework: 
 Among all of the academic specialties customarily identified as social sciences, polit-
ical science is perhaps the greatest “debtor” discipline, in the sense that so many of 
the theories and methods and models put to the task of understanding politics are 
borrowed from scholars working in other fields. (Zorn and Smith, (2011), p.83)  
 
In this regard it seemed to be natural to search for inspiration and explanatory power 
in the domain of quantum physical models and their generalizations. (In this paper we 
shall consider a generalized quantum model obtained via extension of complex num-
bers to the hyper-complex algebra.) 
   
 
                                                          
1   Many of these findings focus on the violation of classical probabilistic scheme (by Kolmo-
gorov, (1933)) of capturing the events and decision outcomes.  The most well known effects 
that violate the classical representation of observables in the probability space are the con-
junction and disjunction errors. These effects emerge due to the presence of contextuality. 
Its vital impact is measured and discussed in e.g., Conte et al., (2007) Busemeyer and Bruza 
(2012), Haven and Khrennikov (2009). 
2 U.S. Political system and the non-separability phenomenon 
The US political system has a governance structure based on divided partisan control 
formed by the so called executive power attributed to the President of the U.S. and the 
legislative power formed by the Congress of the U.S.2. Moreover, two parties histori-
cally dominated the political arena: the Democrats and the Republicans. For that rea-
son the U.S. has an established two party political system. 
Historically, the voters used to hold stable preferences by supporting the same po-
litical party in both the White House and  (at least one) Houses of Congress elections. 
In this regard a large body of orthodox studies on voting preferences perceived such 
power accumulation as a matter of fact and argued that the divided government 
should be perceived as a negative occurrence that rather inhibits the normal function-
ing of the political system  (Cutler (1980), McCubbins (1991) Alvarez and Schousen 
(1993) and others). Zorn and Smith (2011) put forward that voters who strive to max-
imize their returns in terms of the political power would naturally choose the same 
party in both types of elections. These types of preferences would be consistent with 
the postulates of modern decision theories (e.g. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1953) and Savage (1954)) implying completeness and invariance of the choice alter-
natives.  
However, during the last 40 years the situation with power distribution started to 
change, in particular after the Watergate scandal related to the presidency of Richard 
Nixon.3 The US voters started to search to separate the power as to balance the politi-
cal decisions. 4  First attention to this phenomenon was paid by Morris Fiorina 
(1981,1996) who explained this behavior of voters not as a random occurrence, but as 
a purposive (but not necessarily conscious) motivation to balance the political power 
as to sustain a less extreme political course (in either direction). 
A recent study by Smith et al. (1999) showed that the voters are highly influenced by 
the upcoming information concerning the outcomes of the Presidential elections. In 
particular the voters strongly relate the outcomes of the Presidential elections to their 
subsequent decisions making. In fact they often change their preferences in favor of 
an opposition party for the Congress elections based on the obtained information. This 
phenomenon called by Smith et al. (1999) “non- separability” of preferences implies 
that a particular informational context affects the “mental state” of the voters in a way 
that is incompatible with their previous beliefs.  
More than a half of the respondents in the study by Smith et al (1999) exhibited a 
“non-separability” of preferences, where the new informational context strongly 
changed the point of view of the participants. The impact of the new information is 
especially appearing in the considerable amount of participants that elicited their pref-
erences from uncertainty/ignorance (the answer’ don’t know) to firm preferences in 
favor of a particular party in the Congress elections. With line with the psychological 
                                                          
2 Senate and the House of Representatives.  
3 For statistical data see e.g., http//www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/statistics.html. 
4 A type of government where different parties dominate the Congress and the White House is 
often labelled a  “gridlock”. 
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studies in decision theory by Kahneman and Tversky (2003) we can witness that the 
all- inclusive context implying a stability of preferences is not preserved.  
 
 
2.1  Non- Separability in Quantum framework.  
 
The first endeavor to incorporate the phenomenon of non- separability was done 
through a static representation of the choice outcomes in a one dimensional Euclidian 
space (see Fiorina  (1996) and Smith et al. (1999)). However, as pointed out by Zorn 
and Smith (2011) the simplicity of this model entailed some limitations such as a lack 
of dynamical representation of the decision maker’s state evolution as well as no ac-
count has been made for additional (contextual) factors impacting the preference 
emergence, i.e. the upcoming information and the mental characteristics of the voter.  
  For this reason a Hilbert space representation of the observables (the party prefer-
ences) was proposed by depicting the superposition of the initial mental state of the 
voter. The final state decoherence into the particular eigenvectors is context depend-
ed, where a dynamical simulation that also accounted for the impact of the environ-
mental context (the election campaign “bath”) was proposed by Khrennikova et al. 
(2014).  
This paper builds on the findings by Khrennikova et al (2014) by showing a viola-
tion of classical probabilistic updating of voters beliefs that yields in the violation of 
the Law of total Probability (Kolmogorov, 1933). We show that the voters’ decision 
probabilities for the decision outcomes exhibit non- additivity, which can be captured 
through the quantum probability formula (Von Neumann, (1933)). The interference 
term in this formula accounts for the non- classicality of the observables (we cannot 
represent them in the classical probability space). We prove that we can apply Born 
rule by reconstructing the superposition state for our observables from the obtained 
eigenvalues and the transition probabilities. Furthermore, we obtain such a large mag-
nitude of (called by Khrennikov (2010) “hyperbolic”) interference for one of our ei-
genvectors that constrains a complex number Hilbert space representation of the ob-
servables, instead we propose for a hyperbolic Hilbert space state representation.  
 
 
 
 
 
3  Non separability and violation of classical probabilistic 
framework: empirical evidence. 
For the purpose of measuring how the occurrence of non-separability is reflected in 
the classical probabilistic scheme, we extracted the frequencies from the study of 
Smith et al. (2009) that presented   interview outcomes for 930 respondents5 before 
the 1996 elections (with Bob Dole and Bill Clinton as presidential candidates). 
The interview had a within group design and was performed in three stages (that 
we will call “informational contexts”) to test for the occurrence of non- separability.   
Firstly, a general question was asked to the respondents that sounded: “ Which par-
ty is the best choice for managing the U.S. Congress?” (p.748) The aim of this ques-
tion was to establish a baseline of the preferences, which subsequently would be 
compared to the conditioned responses shaped by the next questions. This question 
was embedded in a context of similar questions about partisan preferences, which 
assumingly was related to the elimination of order effect.  
Secondly, the same respondents were contacted again and provided with following   
informational context:  
“If Bob Dole were to be elected President, which would you prefer: a Republican 
Congress to help him pass his agenda or a Democratic Congress to serve as a check 
on his agenda?” (Smith et al (1999), p.747).  Subsequently, the question was reverted 
to an opposite informational context (If Bill Clinton were to be elected president…) 
and posed to the same respondents.  
We denote our baseline context as C = 𝜆 {R, D, N), corresponding choice out-
comes: Democratic Congress, Republican Congress and ‘don’t know’. 
The contexts for Dole and Clinton are denoted by P {R, D} = 𝜆 {R, D, N). Thus we 
have a baseline context and two conditional observational contexts (Dole/ Clinton) 
that all can yield three outcomes: republican, democratic and don’t’ know. We decid-
ed to include the participants who were uncertain6 as well, since the amount of these 
participants is substantial in the baseline context (as we see from the table 1 it is 
around 28%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5  For the baseline question concerning the general preferences for Democratic/Republican 
congress the sample consisted of 937 respondents. 
6 The ‘ don’t know’ answer could be due to uncertainty, but also to a lack of interest  to the 
election contests in general.  
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We summarize the finding of the interviews in a table below:7 
 
  C= D C= R C=N 
Baseline ( C) 0.323 0.406 0.271 
Dole (P=R) 0.544 0.398 0.058 
Clinton (P=D) 0.318 0.629 0.054 
 
Table 1. (source: Smith et al., 1999) 
3.1  Classicality of the obtained probabilities: a check with the Law of Total 
Probability. 
According to De Finetti (1972) the Law of total Probability and the notion of condi-
tional probabilities were applied as the core inputs the of modern decision theory  ( in 
economics and other fields)  throughout the 20th Century. The Law of total Probabil-
ity that is derived with the aid of Bayesian conditional probabilities  (see Kolmogo-
rov, (1933)), as is manifest by its name, denotes the total probability of an outcome 
given its fulfillment through different distinct events.   
The formula of the Law of total Probability obeys the principle of additivity and ena-
bles to express the occurrence of an outcome (p(C=𝜆)) through conditional probabili-
ties (p(C=𝜆|P=D), p(C=𝜆|𝑃 = 𝑅) and the marginal probabilities given by p(P=D) and 
p(P=R). The (P=D) and  (P=R) are disjoint events,  (P=D) ∩ (P=R) =∅. 
It should be denoted that the probabilities applied for statistical decision making (on 
the right hand of the formula of Total Probability) could be as well objective probabil-
ities, calculated on the basis of the previous statistical experience8 (e.g. tossing of a 
coin) as well as subjective probabilities, based on one’s personal experience/ beliefs. 
Both of them are interpretations of the Bayesian probabilities.  
In our study we deal with subjective formation of voters preferences, whereas the 
marginal probabilities encoded in the informational contexts are objective probabili-
ties. Since we have the same amount of study participants (N= 983) in our Dole/ Clin-
ton contexts we treat them as being equal, p(P=D)= p(P=R)= 0.5. 
By inserting our frequencies into the Law of total Probability we calculate the base-
line probabilities (C=R, C=D and C=N) and examine if they correspond with the ob-
tained results from the baseline context.  
 
𝑝(𝐶=𝐷) = (𝑃=𝐷) (𝐶=𝐷|𝑃=𝐷) +(𝑃=𝑅) (𝐶=𝐷|𝑃=𝑅)                                             (1) 
                                                          
7  The frequencies for conditional probabilities are taken from table 1; p.748 and the com-
pound probabilities are taken from table 2, p. 749.  We should note that the baseline context, 
had N= 937 and Dole / Clinton contexts, N= 983. 
8   We can also express the objective probabilities as given probabilities, which are known to 
the decision maker from the external sources.  
0.323 ≠  0.5 ∗ 0.317 + 0.5 ∗ 0.544 = 0.43                                               (2) 
 
 𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑅) =  𝑃(𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑅|𝑃 = 𝐷) +  𝑝(𝑃 = 𝑅)(𝐶 = 𝑅|𝑃 = 𝑅) = 0.406 ≠ 0.5 ∗ 0.629 + 0.5 ∗ 0.398 = 0.514                                           (3) 
 
𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑁) = 𝑃(𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑝(𝐶 = 𝑁|𝑃 = 𝐷) + 𝑝(𝑃 = 𝑅)(𝐶 = 𝑁|𝑃 = 𝑅) = 0.271 ≠ 0.5 ∗ 0.054 + 0.5 ∗ 0.058 = 0.056                                              (4) 
 
We obtained violation of the additivity of the conditional probabilities that com-
pose all the baseline outcomes’ probabilities. This violation is due to the preference 
reversal that occurs in the different informational contexts, which changes the mental 
state of the participants, especially in the ‘don’t know’ outcome. This probabilistic 
error is well known through the works by Tversky and Shafir (1992) and Croson 
(1999), when the disjunction of two conditional events is judged as being lower or 
higher as the compound outcome. We suggest that our observational contexts exhibit 
non-classicality from the point of view of traditional probability theory and a different 
state space representation would be necessary to accommodate our observables and 
their impact on the decision makers’ mental states. We proceed with incorporating our 
probability outcomes in a generalized Law of total Probability, the quantum probabil-
ity formula that captures the interference of the complex probability amplitudes of the 
different decision outcomes that are manifest in the superposition state (represented as 
a state vector). The representation of the observables with help of quantum probability 
formula is of particular relevance to the field of political science since the so-called “ 
swing voters” that are still in a superposition of various decisions are of particular 
attention in each US election campaign. 
 
 
4 Generalized quantum representation of belief state  
Quantum probability formula is an extension of the classical law of probability 
with a special interference term; that can exhibit positive, negative or zero interfer-
ence. Moreover, the particular observational context can yield the traditional ‘cos’ 
interference as well as a more exotic hyperbolic interference for which a hyper-
complex Hilbert space would be needed.9 
    By applying the quantum probability formula we calculate the interference angles: 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Were the state vector is represented with hyperbolic numbers (𝑥 +  𝑦 𝑗,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗2 =  +1), in-
stead of complex numbers. 
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𝑝(𝐶 = 𝐷) =      𝑝(𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑝(𝐶 = 𝐷|𝑃 = 𝐷) + 𝑝(𝑃 = 𝑅)(𝐶 = 𝐷|𝑃 = 𝑅) +2𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃�(𝑝(𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑝(𝐶 = 𝐷|𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑝(𝑃 = 𝑅)𝑝(𝐶 = 𝐷|𝑃 = 𝑅)                         (5) 
 
𝑃 (𝐶 = 𝐷) =  0.5 ∗ 0.317 + 0.5 ∗ 0.544 + 2 cos 𝜃 √0.5 ∗ 0.317 ∗ 0.5 ∗ 0.544  
                                                                                                       (6) 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 =  −0.257;
𝜃 = 1.83.                                                                                            (7) 
This observable outcome yields destructive interference; the absolute value of inter-
ference term is less than 1 denoting a trigonometric interference. Therefore it is possi-
ble to represent it as cos of some angle (phase). The same appears in the (𝐶 = 𝑅) 
outcome: 
             (𝐶 = 𝑅):   cos 𝜃 = − 0.216; 𝜃 = 1.79.                                                   (8) 
The  (𝐶 = 𝑁)case differs crucially from the (𝐶 = 𝐷) and (𝐶 = 𝑅) outcomes. Here 
interference is constructive and the interference term has very high magnitude (which 
encodes a really strong contextuality effect). Such interference term cannot be repre-
sented in the trigonometric form, but in the hyperbolic way as:  (𝐶 = 𝑁):  cosh 𝜃 = 3.84; 𝜃 = 2.021.                                                             (9) 
 
We can summarize that two of our decision outcomes show destructive interfer-
ence of sufficiently low (although nonzero) magnitude, a trigonometric interference 
that can be well explained by the preference reversal were the upcoming information 
elucidates the subjects’ preferences in favor of the respective party in the Congress. 
Consequently, those participants who do not have any firm preferences in the baseline 
context exhibit a strongly constructive interference, a hyperbolic interference (for 
which a hyperbolic Hilbert space representation is needed, see Khrennikov (2010) for 
a elaboration on how such type of data is modelled and Nyman (2011) for mathemati-
cal details.) 
    When the informational context is altered to (P=D and P=R) the probability of  
(C=N) is evaporating and the upcoming information is strongly interfering with the 
initial weak preference attitude. In the next subsection we perform a state reconstruc-
tion for the mental state vector of the voters using the obtained probabilities for our 
outcomes (C=D, C= R and C=N). 
 
4.1 Reconstruction of the mental state by the generalized Born rule. 
 
By Born’s rule one can reconstruct individual initial mental state Ψ using the matrix 
of transition probabilities: 
 
0.317 0.5440.629 0.3980.0539 0.058                                                                                     (10) 
 
 
Firstly, represent P (C=D) as probability amplitude of Ψ to check if the Born rule 
(determination of quantum probabilities from probability amplitudes) can be applied:                                                         𝑃(𝐶 = 𝐷) =  | 𝛹1|2                                      (11) 
𝛹1 = � (𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑃(𝐶 = 𝐷|𝑃 = 𝐷) +                              𝑒𝑖𝜃� 𝑃(𝑃 = 𝑅) 𝑃(𝐶 = 𝐷|𝑃 = 𝑅),                                        (12) 
By Euler’s formula we obtain:                                 𝑒𝑖𝜃 =  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 +  𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃 =  −0.257 +   0.967𝑖                        (13) 
  
             𝛹1 =  �(0.5 ∗ 0.317) +  (−0.257 + 0.967 𝑖)�(0.5 ∗ 0.544) = 0.265 + 0.5𝑖 = |0.265 +0.5i| = √0.2652 + 0.52                                                              (14)                         | 𝛹1|2 = 0.32.                                                                                (15) 
Next, we reconstruct the state vector for our second outcome in a similar way:                        𝑃( 𝐶 = 𝑅) =      𝑃| 𝛹2|2                                                                (16) 
𝛹2 =  �(0.5 ∗ 0.317) +  (−0.216 + 0.976 𝑖)�(0.5 ∗ 0.398) = 0.465 +  0.435𝑖  
= |0.465 +0.435i| = √0.4652 + 0.4352                                                              (17)                       | 𝛹2|2 = 0.405                                                                                (18)                                                       
 
We reconstruct the state vector Ψ3 for the third outcome (C=N) by taking use of 
the generalized Born rule with hyperbolic numbers: 
 
𝛹3 =  �(𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑃(𝐶 = 𝑁|𝑃 = 𝐷) + 𝑒𝑗𝜃�(𝑃 = 𝐷)𝑃(𝐶 = 𝑁|𝑃 = 𝑅) = 𝜆 + 𝑒𝑗𝜃𝛽  
                                                                                                               (19) 
 
By the hyperbolic analogue of the Euler formula we obtain:         𝑒𝑗𝜃 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃 + 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃                                                                               (20) 
The elements of the complex hyperbolic algebra have the form: 
𝑧 = 𝑥1 + 𝑖𝑥2 + 𝑗𝑥3;    𝑥𝑗 ∈ ℝ, 
where: |𝑧  |2 = 𝑧𝑧̅. 
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We can represent our state vector:  
              Ψ3= 𝐴 + 𝑗𝐵 = 𝜆 + 𝑒𝑗𝜃 𝛽 = (𝜆 + coshθ𝛽) + 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝛽               (21) 
 |𝛹3|2 = 𝐴2 −  𝐵2 = (𝜆 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃 𝛽)2 − 𝛽2 𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃2                 (22) 
 
We remark that the 𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃2 can be expressed as a relation: 
𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃2 − 1                                                                               (23)  
Thus: |𝛹3|2 =  𝜆2 + 2𝜆𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃 + 𝛽2  (𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃2 −  𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃2 ) = 𝜆2 + 2𝜆𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃 + 𝛽2                                                                             (24) 
By inserting the frequencies from the table 1 we obtain: 
 
𝛹3 = √0.5 ∗ 0.054 + 𝑒𝑗𝜃 √0.5 ∗ 0.058 = 0.164 + 0.17𝑒𝑗𝜃                     (25) 
  
We express 𝑒𝑗𝜃  through the Euler formula for hyperbolic numbers: 
 
𝛹3 = (0.164 + 0.17𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ𝜃) + 0.17 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃 = 0.81 + 0.17 𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃  
                                                                                                (26) |𝛹2| =  𝐴2 − 𝐵2 = (0.164 + 0.17 cosh𝜃)2 − 0.029𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ𝜃2 =  
0.027+2*0.164*0.17*3.84+0.029= 0.27 10                                                (27) 
 
 
We were able to reconstruct the mental state vector: 𝛹 = ( 𝜓1,𝜓2,𝜓3), belonging to 
the Hilbert space over the hyperbolic algebra. In this space we can select the canoni-
cal basis 𝑒1 = (1,0,0), 𝑒2 = (0,1,0), 𝑒3 = (0,0,1).  Thus the (hyper-complex) Born 
rule takes the form:  
 
𝑃(𝐷) =  |< 𝜓 , 𝑒1 >|2, 𝑃(𝑅) =  |< 𝜓 , 𝑒2 >|2, 𝑃(𝑁) =  |< 𝜓 , 𝑒3 >|2. 
                                                                                                                  (28) 
 
The question observable about Congress elections can be represented as the diagonal 
operator C in the basis 𝑒1, 𝑒2, and 𝑒3. Since the matrix of transition probabilities (10) 
is not doubly stochastic the questions, about the Presidential elections cannot be rep-
resented with the aid of Hermitian operators (in hyper-complex Hilbert space.) One 
has to use the hyper-complex analog of operator-valued measures. 
 
                                                          
10 In a hyperbolic space it could be the case that |𝑧|2 < 0 so that negative probabilities could 
appear. This is not a problem since the negative probabilities are not present as probabilities 
of the results of mental state measurements. For a detailed treatment of negative probabili-
ties see, e.g., De Barros (2013).  
5 Concluding remarks  
In this article we have examined how the upcoming information concerning the 
outcomes of election campaign changes the preferences of the voters through analyz-
ing the data from the study by Smith et al (1999). It has been shown that the voters do 
not only cast ballots for different parties, but even when doing it are highly impacted 
by the informational context, were the voters with no firm preferences form their 
opinions by conditioning them on the obtained information.  We have shown non-
classicality of voters’ behavior due to the incompatibility of the observational con-
texts that cannot be embedded into single classical probability space model.  
Based on the obtained probabilities we were able to reconstruct the initial mental 
state vector of the decision makers that adheres to the (generalized) Born rule. We 
propose for the representation of the observables that act upon the voters’ cognitive 
states in hyper-complex three-dimensional Hilbert space. Thus our probabilistic rep-
resentation is not only non-classical (i.e., non-Kolmogorovian), but can neither be 
described by canonical quantum formalism. Instead its generalization has to be ap-
plied. 
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